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I. INTRODUCTION
"What is said of a man is nothing. The point is who says it.
Oscar Wilde may not have had defamation in mind when he
penned those words, but their resounding message in the
defamation context is fitting: The other "W" words-who, where,
when, and why-are sometimes more important than the "what" in
this complex area of tort law.2 A survey of the past fifty years of
jurisprudence in the United States shows a great fluctuation in
defamation law. This fluctuation is demonstrated by the dramatic
shift from the plaintiff-friendly era of strict liability under common
law to the constitutional requirements placed on plaintiffs by the
actual malice standard.3  Since the United States Supreme Court
interjected its authority into defamation law in the 1960's, the
states are now left the task of cleaning up the confusion created by
the high court. Much of the states' difficulty stems from attempts
to classify different types of plaintiffs and defendants, set different
fault standards, and fill in gaps left by the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence.4
Gaps in Louisiana defamation law became the central issue
when Jack in the Box 5 petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court for
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Oscar Wilde, Letter to Lord Alfred Douglas, in ENOTES.COM, THE
COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 2006),
http://history.enotes.com/famous-quotes/what-is-said-of-a-man-is-nothing-the-
point-is-who (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
2. To help the reader digest the mass of information needed for a defamation
analysis, please refer to the appendix for definitions and categorical information
that will be helpful throughout the note.
3. The "actual malice" standard, which is discussed in depth infra Part II.B,
requires that a plaintiff prove a defendant knows a defamatory statement is false or
has a reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Historically, there are three important classifications that impact the way
in which a defamation action is handled: (1) whether the plaintiff is classified as
private or public; (2) whether the defendant is classified as media or non-media;
and (3) whether the matter in question is of private or public concern. See
generally FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT
LAW § 19 (2d ed. 2004).
5. Jack in the Box, Inc., was one of two original defendants in the case,
Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 899 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 2005),
[Vol. 68300
NOTES
certiorari to address a defamation claim against it arising from an
incident at its Baton Rouge restaurant in December of 2001.
Alfred Kennedy, III entered the drive-through lane of a Jack in the
Box restaurant to make an order.6  When he tendered a one
hundred dollar bill for payment, a restaurant employee suspected it
was counterfeit and, after conducting a naked eye examination,
notified law enforcement officers. 7  Thereafter, Kennedy was
handcuffed and detained at a sheriffs substation while the
authenticity of the bill was investigated.8 The police later found
the bill to be legitimate and released Kennedy, who then filed suit
against the restaurant and sheriffs office seeking damages.
9
Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment in
response to Kennedy's complaint, and the trial court granted them
both, dismissing the claims.' 0  With respect to Kennedy's
defamation claim, the court found no sufficient showing of malice
to support such a claim. 1" However, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal concluded the defendants, in accusing Kennedy of
the crime without any training to detect counterfeit currency,
"failed to show that they acted reasonably or without reckless
disregard for Mr. Kennedy's rights."'12  Thus, the first circuit
vacated the district court's order and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. 13
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
Kennedy defamation claim: a claim that pits a private plaintiff
against a non-media defendant in a matter of public concern.'
4
writ granted, 920 So. 2d 217 (La. 2006), and was the sole defendant remaining
when the case reached the Louisiana Supreme Court, Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.
Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669 (La. 2006).
6. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 673.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kennedy, 899 So. 2d 682.
10. Jack in the Box filed an exception of no cause of action, which was
denied, and an alternative motion for summary judgment. Id. at 684.
11. See generally id
12. Id. at 689.
13. Id.
14. Kennedy, 920 So. 2d 217. For more information about the significance of
the italicized terms, see the tables in the appendix, infra.
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More specifically, the court considered whether the Jack in the Box
employee enjoyed a qualified privilege when reporting the suspected
counterfeit currency to the police, and if so, what evidence would be
sufficient for the plaintiff to prove abuse of that privilege.
Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge15 represents the
Louisiana Supreme Court's most recent effort to answer the
lingering uncertainties in Louisiana's treatment of defamation law.
Three significant developments stand out from the decision: (1) the
end of Louisiana's strict liability defamation regime due to broad
constitutional protections afforded to all defendants, with the
possibility of a small window left for strict liability only in matters
of private concern; 16 (2) the adoption of a uniform negligence
standard for all private defamation plaintiffs; and (3) a heightened
burden on plaintiffs to prove abuse of a qualified privilege, a
burden that will influence many defamation cases and revive
remnants of the New York Times 17 actual malice standard for the
foreseeable future.
This note seeks to guide the reader through the historical
development of defamation law on the national and state level,
critically analyze significant developments of the Kennedy
decision, and predict its impact on future defamation litigation in
Louisiana. Part II examines the common law-influenced history of
defamation in Louisiana under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315,
as well as constitutional developments by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Part II ends with a short discussion of the uncertainties remaining
in Louisiana that the Kennedy court sought to address. Part III
critically analyzes the three significant areas of the decision: (1)
constitutional protections afforded to all defendants; (2) the
adoption of a uniform negligence standard for all private plaintiffs;
and (3) the affirmation of a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs to
prove abuse of a qualified privilege. Finally, the conclusion
15. 935 So. 2d 669 (La. 2006).
16. In strict liability defamation, if the words are considered defamatory, the
elements of fault, falsity, and damages are presumed in favor of the plaintiff,
which places the burden on the defendant. See MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note
4, § 19.01.
17. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussed in detail infra
Part II.B).
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scrutinizes the Kennedy decision and predicts its future impact on
defamation law in Louisiana.
II. BACKGROUND
The depth of the Kennedy decision can not be fully appreciated
by a cursory reading because it represents a culmination of years of
defamation law. Louisiana defamation law has been a fifty-year
consolidation of many issues: a base of common law tradition,
blurred plaintiff and defendant classifications and standards of
liability, and even a dash of constitutional law-compliments of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Kennedy decision is the Louisiana
Supreme Court's attempt at a convergence of all of those
ingredients-a convergence in which the historical development of
defamation law plays an important role.
A. Common Law Defamation in Louisiana
Defamation is a tort that involves the invasion of a person's
interest in his or her reputation or name in the community.' 8 The
Louisiana Supreme Court thoroughly addressed this tort in the
2004 decision Costello v. Hardy.'9 Costello set forth four elements
necessary for a successful defamation claim: (1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning another;20 (2) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the
part of the publisher;2 and (4) resulting injury.22
18. Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (citing Sassone v.
Elder, 626 So. 2d 345, 350 (La. 1993) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th ed. 1984))).
19. 864 So. 2d 129 (La. 2004).
20. "Defamatory words are, by definition, words which tend to harm the
reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the community,
to deter others from associating or dealing with the person, or otherwise expose a
person to contempt or ridicule." Costello, 864 So. 2d at 140 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977)). The question of whether words are
defamatory is a legal question for the court. Sassone, 636 So. 2d at 350.
21. Although the fault requirement now requires negligence or greater in
almost all cases, the traditional common law standard was that of malice, either
actual or implied. See MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02.
22. Trentecosta, 703 So. 2d at 559 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 558 (1977)).
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In Louisiana, defamatory words are divided into two
categories: (1) those that are defamatory per se because they either
accuse another of criminal conduct or by their nature tend to harm
the reputation of another; and (2) those that are susceptible of
defamatory meaning given the circumstances.23 Traditionally,
when a plaintiff proves publication of defamatory per se words, the
elements of falsity and malice (fault) are presumed, but the
presumption can be rebutted by the defendant.24 However, the
plaintiff must prove all the elements of defamation in cases where
the words are merely susceptible of defamatory meaning, or where
25 2constitutional protections are in place.26
A defendant may defeat a prima facie case by asserting one of
the two most common defenses available: truth or privilege. 27 If
the defendant proves that the alleged defamatory statement is true,
then recovery is precluded because the tort's first element, a false
statement, is not met. The second defense, privilege, is deeply
rooted in the common law. It was originally developed as a
remedy to the harsh system of strict liability, and the defense
reflects the state's public policy of promoting free communication
in certain instances.2 8
There are two types of privileges: absolute and qualified.
Absolute privileges are restricted to limited circumstances, such as
23. Costello, 864 So. 2d at 140. In this case, the plaintiff alleged in a petition
that the defendant's work as her attorney fell below the professional standard of
care, to which the attorney filed a reconventional demand for defamation. Id. The
Louisiana Supreme Court found the words to be defamatory under those
circumstances because they "tend to diminish [the attorney's] reputation with
respect to his profession." Id. at 141.
24. Id. (citing Kosmitis v. Bailey, 685 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1996)). The "injury" element may also be presumed. In cases of words that are
defamatory per se, the defamation action essentially becomes a strict liability tort.
See MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.01.
25. See infra Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the constitutional
protections.
26. Costello, 864 So. 2d at 140-41.
27. Id. at 141.
28. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 681 (La. 2006).
See also Richard L. Barnes, The Constitutional Fault Test of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and the Continued Vitality of the Common Law Privileges in the Law
of Defamation, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 804-06 (1978).
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certain communications during judicial proceedings. 29 Qualified
privileges 30 are not restricted to specific circumstances but depend
upon whether there is a justification to protect the interests of the
communicator or the public. 31 Louisiana courts recognize various
qualified privileges dealing with both private and public interests.
For instance, the "fair comment on public affairs" privilege often
protects police officers giving interviews about arrests. 32  in
addition, private interests are protected by privileges in some
circumstances, such as alleged defamatory remarks among an
ecclesiastical board.33 Regardless of whether it is a matter of
public or private concern, the focus of the inquiries into the
existence of a privilege is on the good faith of the communicator,
whether the communicator has an interest or duty with regard to
the communication, and whether it is disclosed to a person with a
corresponding interest or duty.
34
A qualified privilege is ultimately the court's recognition of the
need to balance the individual's right of reputation against
competing interests of either a third party or the public. It is "a
defense based on the weighing of (1) the protection of the interest
of the offended person against the harm done to his or her
reputation, and (2) the protection of the interest of the public in
receiving the information if it were true." 35 Equally important to
the application of a qualified privilege is the standard of proof
required to show abuse of a privilege-an issue discussed in depth
infra Part III.C.
29. Kennedy, 682-83.
30. The words "qualified" and "conditional" are synonymous with regard to
privileges. For purposes of uniformity, "qualified" will be used throughout this
note.
31. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 682.
32. Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 563-64 (La. 1997) (recognizing fair
comment privilege but declining to extend qualified privilege to defamatory
statements a police officer made during a newspaper interview where the officer
had no reason to believe the statements to be true).
33. Joiner v. Weeks, 383 So. 2d 101, 102 n.3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), cited in
MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02, at n.22. See generally Barnes,
supra note 28.
34. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 682 (citing Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So. 2d 723,
725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)).
35. Trentecosta, 703 So. 2d at 560.
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B. Constitutional Requirements
After years of common law dictating the course of defamation
as a strict liability tort, the U.S. Supreme Court left an undeniable
impression on the tort with its decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,36 which inserted First Amendment concerns into actions
brought by public officials. This pronouncement shaped the course
of defamation law for nearly the next half century. 37 The decision
emphasized a democracy's need for free, robust speech in public
affairs. It "not only imposed the requirement of a high degree of
fault in defamation actions brought by public officials, but also
shifted the burden of proof of fault to the public official., 38
More specifically, the free speech protections the high court
afforded in New York Times prevents public officials from
recovering for defamation without a showing that the statement
was made with "actual malice," or in other words, with knowledge
that the statement is false or with reckless disregard for its truth.39
The heightened standard established by the Court makes it more
difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of defamation.
The new standard also shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff, a
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (in which a local police commissioner brought a libel
action against four clergymen and the New York Times newspaper stemming from
a full page advertisement that contained inaccuracies about police conduct).
37. While each state was previously free to set its own fault standard, the New
York Times decision represented the first time the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a
requirement of fault, although it was limited to a public official plaintiff and a
media defendant. The decision led one prominent legal scholar to dub it "the
greatest victory won by defendants in the modem history of the law of torts."
PROSSER ON TORTS § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971), quoted in ROBERT D. SACK,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-6, n.22 (3d ed. 2001). See also Joel
D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Richard A.
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782
(1986); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun and Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A
New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519
(1987).
38. Trentecosta, 703 So. 2d at 560.
39. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. For discussion of the difference
between the use of the word "malice" in common law and in New York Times, see
Patrick J. McNulty, The Law of Defamation: A Primer for the Iowa Practitioner,
44 DRAKE L. REv. 639 (1996).
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drastic change from the strict liability presumptions previously
provided to plaintiffs.40  The Supreme Court, in subsequent
opinions, extended the actual malice standard to public figures
4
'
and, in the furthest extension by the high court, to all matters of
public concern regardless of the classification of the plaintiff.
42
Only a few years later, the Supreme Court changed course by
adopting a more hands-off approach to defamation in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 4 3 The Court recognized the states' interest in
protecting the reputations of their citizens by rejecting the previous
"matter of public concern" approach.44  Further, the Court
distinguished between public and private plaintiffs and determined
that private plaintiffs were entitled to more extensive protection.45
The Court in Gertz established the individual states' freedom to set
their own standards of fault, so long as they do not impose strict
40. For example, under the old regime, a newspaper publisher defendant in a
defamation lawsuit brought by a public figure would have to rebut the
presumption that its story was malicious by introducing evidence that proved it
was not-a burden that caused some self-censorship in the media. In contrast,
after the New York Times decision, a publisher could print any story about a public
figure as long as it was not so outrageous as to be considered "reckless," such as a
completely fabricated story. See Joan E. Schaffner, Protection of Reputation
Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of
Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 433,440-45 (1990).
41. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163--64 (1967) (defining a
public figure as one involved in the resolution of important questions or who
shapes areas of concern in society by virtue of his fame).
42. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (later repudiated by
the Supreme Court, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and
widely criticized). For discussion of the shortcomings of the Rosenbloom opinion,
see Schaffner, supra note 40, at 445-46.
43. 418 U.S. 323 (in which a private individual brought an action against a
media defendant for publishing a magazine article describing the plaintiff as a
"communist-fronter" and commenting on his participation in "Marxist" activities).
44. See Schaffner, supra note 40, at 446. That approach in Rosenbloom relied
on the matter of concern to set the fault standard, rather than the status of the
plaintiff.
45. Id. at 446-47; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46 (finding private plaintiffs more
worthy of protection because they (1) have less opportunity to rebut a defamatory
statement and are more vulnerable to injury than public plaintiffs, and (2) do not
voluntarily assume the risk of injury by placing themselves in the public eye).
2007]
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liability.46 The plurality opinion never explicitly stated the level of
fault necessary to satisfy the constitutional requirements, but the
language suggests that mere negligence will suffice.47 The
Supreme Court later built on its decision in Gertz by holding that
the First Amendment requires a plaintiff to prove falsity in addition
to the Gertz fault requirement.
48
C. Limited Holdings and Lingering Uncertainties
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's defamation
jurisprudence "see-sawing" between plaintiffs' and defendants'
interests, numerous questions have been left unanswered-a
testament to the increasing complexity and breadth of defamation
law. These unanswered questions leave states like Louisiana the
task of making sense out of a strange convergence of longstanding
common law, emerging constitutional law, and competing interests
of the individual and public.
First, the Supreme Court's holdings make it uncertain as to
whom the constitutional protections apply, and whether there is
still a window for strict liability defamation in matters of private
concern. Because the Gertz decision is explicitly limited to media
defendants, some courts have refused to extend the constitutional
protections to non-media defendants, leaving an open window to
strict liability in many cases. 49 U.S. Supreme Court decisions after
46. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47. Reflecting on the Gertz decision and
subsequent resurgence of states in shaping defamation, McNulty writes, "The
states, therefore, have the responsibility of balancing the state interest in
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals with the constitutional
interest of free speech and press." McNulty, supra note 39, at 695.
47. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 6.1, at 2
(1993).
48. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). It is
important to note that the Gertz line of cases is limited in scope to private
plaintiffs against media defendants in matters ofpublic concern.
49. See McNulty, supra note 39, at 695 n.574 (citing, e.g., Vinson v. Linn-
Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984) ("holding that 'where
only a private plaintiff and non-media defendant are involved, the common law
standard does not threaten the free and robust debate of public issues . . .');
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt.
1983) ("holding that the media protections provided in Gertz were not applicable
308 [Vol. 68
Gertz raise the possibility of limited defamation cases in which
there would be no constitutional bar to a return to strict liability.
50
In Kennedy, the Louisiana Supreme Court addresses the possible
distinction between media and non-media defendants and, to a
certain extent, the possibility of strict liability defamation.
5 1
Second, the Gertz line of decisions left each individual state to
determine the standard of fault applicable to private plaintiffs.
These decisions contrast the constitutionally mandated "actual
malice" standard for public plaintiffs announced in New York
Times. 52 For the past thirty-two years, states have utilized their
freedom to adopt different fault standards such as simple
negligence, gross negligence, and the stringent actual malice
standard.53 The Kennedy decision is Louisiana's deepest foray into
the nationwide debate regarding private plaintiff fault standards.
Finally, the most intriguing uncertainty the Kennedy decision
addresses is the possible continued adoption of a higher abuse
standard to defeat a qualified privilege. Since the Gertz decision,
the long-term validity of common law privileges is questionable.
The inherent conflict between the constitutional fault required
(negligence or greater) to establish a prima facie case and the
traditional grounds to prove abuse of a privilege (essentially
negligence as to the truth) brings into question the continuing
to non-media defamation cases")). On the other hand, McNulty argues that
distinguishing between media and non-media defendants would be illogical:
It makes no constitutional sense to rest the Gertz damage rule on the
nature of the speech-public versus private-and base the Gertz rule of
no liability without fault on the status of the defendant-media versus
non-media... freedom of speech is just as much the right of the lonely
pamphleteer as it is the metropolitan publisher.
See McNulty, supra note 39, at 696 n.574.
50. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (holding that in a case with a private plaintiff against a non-media
defendant in a matter of purely private concern, the First Amendment does not
necessarily force a change to traditional common law defamation, such as
presumed damages).
51. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 675-79 (La.
2006).
52. Id. at 679.
53. See generally ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.2, at 4-11.
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validity of common law privileges. 54 While some scholars have
suggested that common law privileges should be eliminated in
favor of a uniform negligence standard,55 others have advocated a
higher abuse standard to defeat a conditional privilege. 56  In a
thorough discussion, the Louisiana Supreme Court took its stand
on the complex issue by affirming the heightened standard for
abuse of a qualified privilege. The court's controversial position
on this issue is perhaps the most important among many
developments that will affect practitioners on both sides of the bar.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Protections: The Non-Media Defendant and the
End of Strict Liability?57
Of the many significant developments in Kennedy, the court's
broad holding mandating constitutional protections regardless of
the defendant's classification fills a gap left by previous court
decisions. Because the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in the
Gertz and Hepps decisions are limited to media defendants, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Kennedy addresses "whether the
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court ... should logically
extend to include non-media defendants. 58 In other words, the
court considered whether the First Amendment protections
supersede common law presumptions of fault and falsity.
54. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 684.
55. See generally Barnes, supra note 28.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note on Conditional
Privileges and the Constitutional Requirement of Fault (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT, Special Note].
57. When referring to defendants, the term "constitutional protection" means
that defendants are protected from being found guilty of defamation based on
presumed fault and falsity. When referring to plaintiffs, that same concept is
expressed by the term "constitutional requirement," since plaintiffs would be
required to prove elements that could formerly be presumed.
58. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 677. The Gertz and Hepps decisions established
that, in defamation cases with media defendants, the First Amendment
requirements supersede common law presumptions of fault, damages, and injury
in matters of public concern-meaning the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Id.
at 676.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to distinguish media
and non-media defendants. Instead, the court granted broad
constitutional protections to defendants regardless of their
classification: "We find that a private individual's right to free
speech is no less valuable than that of a publisher . . . ,59 In
support of its holding, the Kennedy court cited the New York Times
decision, which protected free speech and pointed out that the
constitutional protections applied to "critics of . . . official
conduct." 60  This expansive description is broad enough to
encompass both classes of defendants. Similarly, the court relied
on Gertz, emphasizing that the constitutional lprotections are
imposed to protect First Amendment freedoms.6 1 The court in
Kennedy promptly pointed out that constitutional protections are
not only for the freedom of the press, but also for the freedom of
speech.62
1. Reasons for Adoption of Broad Constitutional Protections
After establishing the underlying purpose of the constitutional
protections-to safeguard First Amendment rights-the court
noted that Louisiana's Constitution contains a similar provision
with the same purpose. 63 The Kennedy court also drew support
from a Louisiana appellate case that apylied the constitutional
protections to a non-media defendant. Further, the court
mentioned other states that have adopted similar holdings by
59. Id. at 678 ("[W]e conclude as a matter of state law that the Gertz and
Philadelphia Newspapers holdings should apply to media and non-media
defendants alike.").
60. Id. at 677 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256
(1964)).
61. Id. at 678.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. I, § 7).
64. Id. (citing Wattigny v. Lambert, 408 So. 2d 1126, 1130-31 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1984)). In Wattigny, a sheriff sued an attorney for defamatory statements
stemming from a wrongful arrest petition in a separate court pleading. The court
applied the actual malice standard because it contended the New York Times
decision sought to protect freedom of speech in addition to freedom of the press.
Wattigny, 408 So. 2d 1126.
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applying a similar rationale. 65  In one of the first post-Gertz
decisions to extend the constitutional protections, Jacron Sales Co.
v. Sindorf, Maryland's high court extended those protections to a
former employer who made defamatory statements to a prospective
employer about the plaintiffs work conduct.66 The case presents a
compelling argument for broad constitutional protections, and the
Jacron decision has been cited by many courts across the country
including the Louisiana Supreme Court.
67
In addition to its reliance on jurisprudence from other states,
the Kennedy court quoted a lengthy passage from the
Restatement's comments explaining in part why the Gertz
principles should apply to all defendants:
[T]he protection of the First Amendment extends to
freedom of speech as well as to freedom of the press, and
the interests that must be balanced to obtain a proper
accommodation are similar. It would seem strange to hold
that the press, composed of professionals and causing much
greater damage because of the wider distribution of the
communication, can constitutionally be held liable only for
negligence, but that a private person, engaged in a casual
private conversation with a single person, can be held liable
at his peril if the statement turns out to be false, without
68any regard to his lack of fault.
65. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 678 (citing Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d
688 (Md. 1976); Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 1976); Ryder Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App. El Paso 1979)).
66. 350 A.2d at 688. Many of the reasons for the broad constitutional
protections present in Kennedy were first argued by the Maryland court in Jacron:
the "instructive" influence of the New York Times decision, reservations about
elevating the media above private defendants for all fault standards and a desire
for consistency in defamation law. See generally id.
67. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 753 (1985); Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 678; Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d
713, 726-27 (Va. 1985); Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 148-49 (Wis. 1982);
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257-58 (Minn. 1980);
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Or. 1977);
Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So.2d 879, 892 (La. 1977); Peagler v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216, 1221-22 (Ariz. 1977).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. e (1977).
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The court seemingly foreclosed any possibility of strict liability
defamation in Louisiana by mandating constitutional requirements
for private plaintiffs against all defendants, without any explicit
limitation to matters of public concern.69  Even so, the court's
holding fails to explicitly address a critical question: Do the
constitutional requirements also apply to a private plaintiff against
a non-media defendant in a matter of purely private concern?
2. Reasons Against Adoption of Broad Constitutional
Protections
The court's broad language in the holding 70 may be interpreted
so as to encompass private speech as well; however, such an
interpretation raises numerous problems. First, the court's reliance
on New York Times and Gertz would be inapplicable with regard to
private speech because it does not raise the same constitutional
concerns as public speech; the state does not have the heightened
level of interest in private speech that it often does in public
speech.7'
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders plurality opinion that the Gertz
constitutional requirements do not apply to a private plaintiff
against a non-media defendant in a matter of purely private
concern.72 Legal scholar David A. Elder contends that the Dun &
69. Because all defendants are provided with constitutional protections, the
burden would be on the plaintiff to prove fault, damages, and injury-all of which
could be presumed under traditional common law if the words were determined to
be defamatory per se. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 678; Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d
129 (La. 2004).
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
71. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 676 n.5 (discussing the holding of Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749, discussed supra note 50). See generally Cangelosi v.
Schweggman Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 390 So. 2d 196 (La. 1980) (applying pre-
New York Times presumed fault in defamation case where a cashier accused her
grocery store management of defaming her in relation to missing money from her
register-speech that is of purely private concern), cited in MARAIST &
GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02, at n.62.
72. 472 U.S. 749 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that Gertz is not only
inapplicable to damages, but also that "some kind of fault on the part of the
defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this"), cited in ELDER, supra note
47, § 6.11, at 49.
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Bradstreet holding rejects numerous state court decisions and
Restatement comments, most of which predicted the Gertz
requirements would cover all defamation suits. 73  Instead, it
appears that Dun & Bradstreet has revived the public versus
private concern debate that was central to the Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.74 decision many years earlier.75
Finally, the plain language of the holding would overrule
Costello v. Hardy, the 2004 Louisiana Supreme Court ruling
allowing for strict liability defamation when speech is considered
defamatory per se and there is a private plaintiff, non-media
defendant, and a matter of private concern.76 It is possible that the
Kennedy decision eliminates all strict liability from Louisiana
defamation. However, it is more likely that the court's
acknowledgement of the Dun & Bradstreet decision and the
application of its principles in Costello will be recognized by lower77
courts despite the overly inclusive language of the holding. This
interpretation allows courts to lower the burden for private
plaintiffs against private defendants in matters of private
concem-a balance that is similar to the public/private speech
distinction made by the court later in the opinion and that aligns it
with established jurisprudence.
B. Adoption of a Uniform Negligence Standard for Private
Plaintiffs
While the court's extension of constitutional protections to all
defendants in Kennedy requires some showing of fault by a
plaintiff, exactly what standard of fault is required for a private
73. ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.11, at 49-50.
74. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
75. ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.11, at 49-50. See also supra notes 42, 44 and
accompanying text. Rather than focusing on the status of the plaintiff as public or
private, the Rosenbloom decision stated that constitutional protections should be
extended to all matters of public concern regardless of the status of the parties.
403 U.S. 29.
76. Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129 (La. 2004).
77. If that interpretation is adopted by lower courts, strict liability defamation
would likely be possible only in cases where there is: (1) a private plaintiff, (2) a
non-media defendant, (3) a matter of purely private concern, and (4) speech that is
considered defamatory per se according to Costello.
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plaintiff is a source of confusion in the wake of Gertz.78  The
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Trentecosta v. Beck
expressly declined to answer the question regarding the standard of
fault applicable to a private plaintiff against a non-media defendant
in a matter of public concern.
79
The Kennedy court adopted the Restatement negligence
standard for all private plaintiffs to respond to Gertz and clarify
Louisiana defamation law. 80  The court adopted the lower
negligence standard and pointed out many distinctions between
public and private plaintiffs8' despite the pleas of current and
former justices for a higher standard of fault.S2
1. Reliance on Gertz Principles
The court relied heavily on the principles of the three decade
old Gertz decision to elaborate on the distinctions between public
and private plaintiffs. First, the court pointed out that the
considerations prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt the
New York Times actual malice standard for public figures did not
apply with equal force to private individuals; this distinction was at
78. See Neuberger, Coerver, & Goins v. Times Picayune Pub. Co., 597 So. 2d
1179 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), cited in ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.2, at 6 n.44.
79. Janine M. Vernaci, Trentecosta v. Beck: Louisiana Law Enforcement
Officers Now Enjoy a Qualified Privilege in Defamation Suits, 44 LoY. L. REv.
339, 350 (1998) (discussing the court's deferral of the liability issue and
questionable application of the New York Times actual malice standard without
further explanation).
80. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 681 (La. 2006).
The Restatement negligence standard is discussed in more detail below, and would
be treated like any standard negligence analysis under Louisiana tort law. For a
discussion of the basic concepts of negligence in a defamation action, see Michael
A. Sarafin, A Rationale for Reforming the Indiana Standard in Private Figure
Defamation Suits, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 617, 638-45 (2001).
81. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 679-81. Those distinctions will be discussed in
detail infra Part III.B.
82. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 565 (La. 1997) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting); Romero v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 648 So. 2d 866, 871 (La.
1995) (Dennis, J., concurring) (contending that the constitutional protections first
discussed in Rosenbloom should apply to any cases of public concern regardless of
the plaintiff's status, inferring that the actual malice standard would apply even to
private plaintiffs).
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the heart of the Gertz decision. 83 Second, the court discussed an
important difference between public and private plaintiffs; namely,
there is less access to channels of effective communication to
counteract false statements for private plaintiffs.84 Although the
strength of this argument may be waning with the advent of mass
media, like twenty-four hour news and the Internet, it remains true
in many ways. 85 For example, if a popular internet blogger were to
post defamatory statements about a current political candidate on a
website, there is a good chance the story could gain media
attention, forcing the politician to respond in the limelight. On the
other hand, if similar comments were posted about a local business
person, the chances of a similar opportunity to respond are
significantly less because of the economic realities of media
coverage. 86
Finally, the court echoed the sentiments of the Gertz decision
by stating that private plaintiffs "are at once both more vulnerable
to injury and more deserving of protection and recovery." 87 The
"more deserving" designation for private plaintiffs stems from the
Gertz rationale that public plaintiffs have voluntarily exposed
themselves to an increased risk of injury.88 However, legal scholar
Joan Schaffner has criticized this justification and said it "assumes
public [plaintiffs] have access to a form of self-help." 89  Even
further, Schaffner asserts that public plaintiffs are arguably more
83. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 681-83. The First Amendment right in reporting
the activities of public plaintiffs is more substantial than private individuals
because it is necessary for free discussion of government.
84. Id. at 679-80. For a discussion of examples regarding public/private
plaintiffs and their interaction with the media, see Sarafin, supra note 80, 655-56.
85. Sarafin, supra note 80, at 655-56. For example, a public plaintiff, such as
a politician, will be better prepared to address defamatory statements in the media
because of his experience in the public arena and dealing with the press, especially
when compared to a private plaintiff.
86. There are obviously factual situations in which a business person could
also be considered a "public figure," but one does not need to stretch his
imagination far to discover scenarios in which public plaintiffs have distinct
advantages over private plaintiffs to counter defamatory statements.
87. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 679 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974)).
88. Id.
89. Schaffner, supra note 40, at 464.
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vulnerable to injury than private plaintiffs because public plaintiffs
often depend on public endorsement for their livelihood. Even
considering valid criticisms, the court's recognition of the
distinction between public and private plaintiffs is one of many
reasons that justify the adoption of a negligence standard.
2. State Interest in Protection of Private Individual Reputation
The court used language in the Louisiana Constitution to
justify a negligence standard in addition to its use of the Gertz
decision. 91 The court focused on the explicit language in article I,
section 7 that protects the reputations of private individuals
because it states that people are "responsible for the abuse of that
freedom [of speech]., 92 The Kennedy court, in similar fashion to
many other states, 93 interpreted that language as an express
concern for the reputation of private individuals; a concern
warranting a lower burden on private plaintiffs in defamation
actions. 94  The court's interpretation rightly acknowledges the
state's interest in not only protecting free speech, but also
protecting the reputations of private individuals.
95
In addition to constitutional support, the court acknowledged
that adoption of the negligence standard in this instance (private
plaintiff/public concern) would simplify Louisiana defamation law,
making the fault standard consistent insofar as private plaintiffs are
concerned. 96 The court held in Costello that proving malice was
"more akin to negligence with respect to the truth than to spite or
90. Id.
91. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 679-81.
92. Id. at 679-80 (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, § 7).
93. In Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okl. 1976), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted a negligence standard based in part on the
same constitutional concerns: "Expressly in its constitution, Oklahoma has
weighted the right with the responsibility for an abuse of that right [freedom of
speech]."
94. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 680-81.
95. The language of the Louisiana Constitution, in contrast to the United
States Constitution, expresses concern for the abuse of freedom of speech. This
express concern is an important factor to consider when balancing the rights of the
private individual and free speech concerns.
96. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 680.
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improper motive." 97  Because the court endorsed a negligence
standard for private plaintiffs in matters of private concern, it
reasoned that applying the same standard for matters of public
concern would simplify defamation law. 98 This particular decision
by the court exemplifies the more "plaintiff friendly" approach
taken by the judiciary, which could stem from concern about the
new areas of defamation emerging through the Internet.
99
Finally, the court noted that adoption of a negligence standard
promotes consistency in defamation law because the vast majority
of states considering the issue in the wake of Gertz have adopted
the negligence standard.'00 According to Elder, approximately
forty-four states 10' have adopted or approved the negligence
standard, while only three have chosen the more stringent actual
malice standard. 1 2  Accordingly, the court adopted the
Restatement version of the negligence standard; meaning that a
person could be held liable for defamation in Louisiana if he
publishes a false and defamatory statement that causes injury and
he either (1) knows the statement is false, (2) acts in reckless
disregard of the truth, or (3) acts negligently in failing to ascertain
the circumstances. 103
97. Id. (quoting Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 143 (La. 2004)).
98. Id.
99. When gauging how "plaintiff friendly" this aspect of the decision is, it is
helpful to note again that the U.S. Supreme Court at one point ruled that any
matter of public concern should be governed by the actual malice standard.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The evolution to the less
stringent negligence standard will create a marked difference in a plaintiff's ability
to prove a prima facie defamation claim.
100. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 681-82. For discussion of the states' responses to
Gertz and the choices between negligence, gross negligence, or actual malice
standards, see ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.2, at 4-18.
101. The District of Columbia has also adopted the negligence standard.
ELDER, supra note 47, § 6.2, at 10.
102. See id.
103. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 680-81 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580B (1977)). This assumes that the publication to a third party is not
subject to an absolute or qualified privilege. Schaffner has discussed factors that
should be considered in a defamation negligence analysis:
To cast this test in a slightly different light, the balancing is a matter of
weighing the probability and gravity of the risk, in light of the social
value of the interest threatened, against the value of the defendant's
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C. Affirming a Stronger Qualified Privilege: Remnants of the New
York Times Standard
1. Historical Basis for Qualified Privilege
Common law privileges were developed as a remedy to the
harsh strict liability system to exempt certain speech from civil
liability. 0 4  The "public interest" privilege is one of the many
privileges invoked by defendants that have been recognized by
Louisiana jurisprudence. 105 One underlying purpose of the "public
interest" privilege is to allow possible criminal activity to be
reported to the proper authorities without fear of liability. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that the public interest
privilege is "vital to our system of justice . . .that there be the
ability to communicate to police officers the alleged wrongful acts
of others without fear of civil action for honest mistakes."'
10 6
The Kennedy court faced a question, after finding that the
"public interest" privilege clearly applied, which shifted the burden
activity to society and the defendant and the cost of alternatives....
[T]he factors on the plaintiff's side of the scale are the following: (1) the
value to society of reputation, (2) the risk of injury to plaintiffs
reputation, and (3) the gravity of the injury to plaintiffs reputation. The
factors on the defendant's side include the following: (1) the value to
society of information dissemination and (2) the cost of increased fact
verification necessary to avoid injury, in terms of both time and money to
defendant.
Schaffier, supra note 40, at 476.
104. Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 563 (La. 1997). See generally supra
Part II.A. The existence of a privilege is based on the good faith of the
communicator, whether he or she has an interest or duty with regard to the
communication, and if it is published to a person with a corresponding interest or
duty.
105. See Simon v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 788 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2001) (ruling that a convenience store employee enjoyed a qualified privilege in
reporting suspected shoplifters to authorities and dismissing the defamation action
on a summary judgment motion). The Restatement says that a statement will be
privileged if circumstances cause one to reasonably believe that "(a) there is
information that affects a sufficiently important public interest, and (b) the public
interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a [proper] public
officer ..... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598 (1977).
106. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 683.
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of proof back to the plaintiff. 10 7 What standard of proof is
necessary to prove abuse of a qualified privilege? Historically, a
privilege was defeated by malice in fact, i.e., actual motives of
personal spite or ill will. 108 In recent years, Louisiana courts have
held that a qualified privilege is abused if a statement is not made
in good faith, or in other words, without "reasonable grounds for
believing the statement to be true."' 0 9  In 1994, the Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that the two standards are synonymous
in the defamation context, and the "reasonable grounds" standard
was adopted for abuse of a privilege. " 0
2. Trentecosta and the Knowing Falsity/Reckless Disregard
Standard
The court had to reconsider its position on the abuse standard
only a few years later because the continuing viability of common
law privileges was called into question."' The inherent conflict
between the constitutional fault required in most if not all cases
(negligence or greater) and the traditional grounds to prove abuse
of a privilege (essentially negligence as to the truth) means that a
plaintiff who makes a prima facie case of defamation also proves
abuse of any privilege that could be asserted. "12 In Trentecosta v.
Beck, the court chose the Restatement's approach to abuse of
qualified privileges after recognizing the conflict and seeking to
preserve the traditional system of privileges." 3 The Trentecosta
decision resulted in the adoption of a more stringent standard that
107. Regarding the burden shift, the court explained, "[T]he practical effect of
the assertion of the conditional or qualified privilege is to rebut the plaintiff's
(Kennedy's) allegations of malice (or fault, which in this case amounts to
negligence) and to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish abuse of
the privilege." Id. at 683 (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 639
So. 2d 730, 746 (La. 1994)).
108. Id. at 683 (citing Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323 (La. 1919)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at684.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 563 (La. 1997)).
113. Trentecosta, 703 So. 2d at 564.
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requires a plaintiff to prove "knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard" by the defendant for abuse of a privilege.' 1
4
Picking up where the Trentecosta decision left off, the court
examined the adoption of the higher standard at length. First, the
court characterized the higher "knowing falsity/reckless disregard"
standard as an approach that "acknowledges the changes" in
defamation law, especially the entry of First Amendment
concerns.11 5  Further, the court stressed the important role that
privileges play in balancing the interests of the individual with
those of third persons or the public: "Adopting the actual malice
standard ... allows courts to continue to balance these competing
interests ... [and] retain the hierarchy of specially Fprotected types
of speech that we have traditionally recognized."'" Additionally,
the court recognized the growing number of jurisdictions adopting
the higher standard and stated that its decision supports the goal of
creating more consistency between constitutional and state law
with respect to defamation." 17
Finally, the court pointed out that the higher standard promotes
the essential public policy of encouraging citizens to report
suspicious activity to the police." 8 Without the higher standard,
the fear of civil liability would deter citizens from reporting
activity-something the court says is unfair to the people reporting
suspected criminal activity in good faith, as well as to the
community at large." 
9
114. Id. It merits mention that Trentecosta concerned a different privilege
(reporting government proceedings and activities) than the privilege asserted in
Kennedy (public interest). See also RESTATEMENT, Special Note, supra note 56.
115. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 684-85.
116. Id. at 685. The "specially protected type of speech" to which the court
refers is one that involves a matter of public concern.
117. Id. The shift to the knowing falsity/reckless disregard standard has been
in large part because of the influence of the Restatement's position, but it is also a
departure from longstanding common law. According to Elder, "The innovation
contained in the oft-cited Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 provision is its
radical preemption of the majority view at common law, i.e., the 'traditional view'
that privilege is forfeited where plaintiff proves publication by defendant without
probable cause or reasonable grounds for belief in truth." ELDER, supra note 47, §
2.3, at 136.
118. Kennedy, 935 So. 2dat685.
119. Id, at 685-86.
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3. A Hollow Victory for Defamation Plaintiffs?
Despite the adoption of the "knowing falsity/reckless
disregard" standard by Louisiana and other jurisdictions, the higher
standard is not without legitimate criticism. Although scholars cite
various reasons for advocating alternatives, most critics of the
Restatement approach agree that it incorrectly assumes that the
Gertz constitutional requirements apply to all defamation claims.
120
As David A. Elder explained while discussing the impact of the
later Dun & Bradstreet ruling, "In other words, the constitutionally
based substrata for the § 600 rule-that reckless disregard of
falsity is likely necessary since negligence is probably required in
all cases of defamation-has been rejected."12
Elder's criticism of the Restatement's approach is not limited
to its incorrect predictions about future trends in defamation. He
also contends that the heightened standard ignores the state's
interest in protecting private individuals' reputations, as evidenced
by many states' constitutional provisions.' 22 Elder further exposes
problems with a higher abuse standard by pointing out that, under
the Restatement's approach, proof of fault that is sufficient to win
damages in a private plaintiff/public concern case (negligence) is
"legally insufficient as a matter of law to overcome a privilege in
the purely private setting that encompasses most of the arena of
common law privilege."
In matters of purely private concern, Elder's argument points
out the inconsistency of states that on one hand claim to have an
interest in protecting the private individual's reputation, but on the
other, apply the knowing falsity/reckless disregard standard even
120. ELDER, supra note 47, § 2.3, at 137.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 138. Elder forcefully states, "This ill-considered, poorly reasoned
perspective runs afoul of the spirit of the decisions interpreting state constitutional
provisions as evidencing a preference for, if not mandating, a post-Gertz rule
intruding least severely on the fundamental interest in reputation." Id.
123. Id. Because truth and privilege are the only two defenses for defamation
actions, it is likely that much of defamation law will be subject to the knowing
falsity/reckless disregard standard-a huge burden on plaintiffs that may not be
warranted in cases of purely private concern where the privilege invoked has
nothing to do with public interests.
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when First Amendment concerns are minimal. 124  Should a
business partner who writes a libelous letter relating to a
partnership's lawsuit to recover money be able to invoke the
"common interest" privilege as a defense? 125  While the
circumstances could justify some type of privilege in a defamation
action, purely private matters do not raise constitutional concerns
and do not justify a privilege that is nearly insurmountable. 126
While Elder's concern is primarily with the inequities private
plaintiffs face in matters of private concern, other scholars criticize
the higher abuse standard on a more systemic level. One such
scholar, Richard L. Barnes, contends that the system of common
law privileges is outdated and should probably be subsumed within
a uniform negligence standard. 127 Barnes argues that the purposes
of the extensive privileges of common law-to alleviate the
harshness of strict liability and balance the interests of the
individual with those of third parties or the public-have been
replaced by the fault system in Gertz.12 8  Barnes' contention
directly challenges the court's statement in Kennedy that the
adoption of a higher abuse standard "acknowledges the changes"
in defamation law. Barnes instead suggests that the shift to a fault
system under Gertz has completely supplanted the need for
privileges.
129
124. Id. Elder also argues that the "uniformity of law" justification does not
warrant a higher standard in all cases just because of the fact that a private
plaintiff's claim for defamation has been made more difficult in cases in which his
interests have been outweighed by important constitutional values: "[I]t does not
follow.., that his recovery should be made more difficult in situations in which
no such constitutional values are involved merely for the sake of securing
symmetry of treatment of defendants." Id. at 139 (citing Harley-Davidson
Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1977)).
125. A "common interest" privilege traditionally exists when any one of
several people with a common interest in the subject matter reasonably believes
that there is information that the others are entitled to know, such as business
partners. Id.
126. This circumstance exemplifies the need for flexibility in determining what
constitutes an abuse of a privilege depending on the circumstances.
127. See Barnes, supra note 28, at 822.
128. Id. at 822-23.
129. Id. at 822-23. Barnes writes, "The requirement of fault is similar to the
common law privileges in that it attempts to protect valuable communications
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Barnes writes: "Gertz may simply be a more modem
expression of the same concerns that motivated the creation of the
common law privilege using a fault test rather than malice."', 30 He
concludes that a uniform negligence system is superior to the
common law privileges for two reasons: (1) it gives uniformity to
tort law by putting defamation under the umbrella of the
negligence analysis,' 3' and (2) the new standard of fault
(negligence) serves a similar function and can be seen as a "vast
privilege," which would eliminate the need for narrower
application. 1
32
4. A Manageable Compromise-Exercising Judicial Restraint
Although criticisms of the "knowing falsity/reckless disregard"
abuse of privilege standard are legitimate in some circumstances,
there are valuable considerations that justify its adoption in some
cases. The adoption of a pure negligence system to determine
abuse of a qualified privilege is too radical of a departure from
previous defamation case law. The abuse standard would then
likely become a jury issue and would be decided on each juror's
individual concept of "reasonableness."' 33  As one scholar has
suggested, because the result is often a "popularity contest"
between the plaintiff and defendant, qualified privileges and the
protections they are designed to provide suddenly become
"tenuous, unpredictable, and inadequate."'
134
The continued vitality of qualified privileges is also necessary
in the wake of the Dun & Bradstreet and Costello rulings. Both
cases suggest that a suit brought by a private plaintiff against a
while recognizing the individual's interest in being free of defamation." Id. at
804.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 819. According to Barnes, "Extension of this negligence standard
[for abuse of privilege] would make uniform a large area of the law of defamation
without a radical departure from the traditional notion that certain communications
deserve protection." Id.
132. Id. It should be noted, contrary to the prediction in Barnes' article, strict
liability probably has not been completely eliminated in Louisiana to date.
133. SACK, supra note 37, at 9--44.
134. Id.
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non-media defendant in a matter of private concern may still be
ruled by strict liability.' 35 To deprive a defendant of the privilege
while also allowing a plaintiff to benefit from presumed fault,
damages, and injury is patently unjust.136 Further, as the court
pointed out, a failure to preserve privileges ignores their value in
balancing the rights of the individual's reputation with those of
third parties or the public.
Finally, the court's adoption of the higher abuse standard in
matters of public concern is an effective way to protect certain
types of speech and encourage public policies that serve the
interests of the community. Because the state wants to encourage
the reporting of possible criminal activity, "[i]ndividuals who
engage in behavior beneficial to society should not be penalized by
facing exposure to civil liability for mistakes in judgment
attributable to simple negligence."'
37
The interests of the public are at stake in a matter of public
concern, and this factor makes the alleged defamer's contribution
more worthy of protection than in a matter of private concern.
138
The court's holding is likely broader than it should be because
Elder's arguments warrant the use of a traditional "reasonable
basis" abuse standard in matters of private concern.' 39 That being
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. This scenario would be similar to the early strict liability era that
necessitated privileges in the first place and invited litigious plaintiffs to sue-a
consequence that could lead to self-censorship of valuable speech.
137. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 685-86 (La.
2006).
138. The difference in the competing interests in matters of public versus
private concern is exactly the point made by Elder in his criticism. See supra Part
III.C.3.
139. The appellate court decision, written by Judge Jefferson Hughes, suggests
that the defendant may not have had a "reasonable basis" to report the suspected
counterfeit bill to police after only observing it; the employees had no formal
training and did not have a "counterfeit pen" present. Kennedy, 899 So. 2d at 689.
Further, his opinion suggests that the actions of the employee could be considered
"reckless," which would result in the abuse of a privilege. Id. at 688-89.
However, the appellate opinion fails to focus on the heightened protection given to
speech in matters of public concern. A failure to investigate currency with a
counterfeit pen is not enough to show "reckless disregard," especially given the
corroborating evidence by the deputies about the suspicious appearance of the bill.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the appellate decision misapplied the
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said, there are undoubtedly valid justifications for the adoption of
the higher standard in matters of public concern.
As an alternative to utilizing the private/public concern
distinction concerning abuse of privilege, Louisiana courts have
the option to examine qualified privileges on a case-by-case basis
under the higher standard. If this method is chosen, however, the
courts should heed the warnings of the Restatement drafters
concerning the extension of qualified privileges:
One important effect of this is that courts will be more
cautious in holding that a conditional privilege exists.
Under circumstances when the court feels that a defendant
should be held liable for defamation if he is merely
negligent, as distinguished from being reckless, then it
should hold that a conditional privilege does not exist in
that particular situation.1
40
Because the Kennedy court adopted the more stringent
Restatement approach regarding abuse of qualified privileges,
lower courts would be wise to use them sparingly to relieve a
private plaintiff of a weighty burden that is reminiscent of the New
York Times standard first handed down over forty years ago.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kennedy decision is a valuable case to Louisiana
practitioners largely because it provides a comprehensive overview
of defamation in Louisiana and attempts to answer some
complicated, unresolved questions of law. In many respects, the
court's decision properly reflects recent trends in defamation law
across the country. The major decisions discussed in the analysis
are generally well supported by the state constitution, federal and
state jurisprudence, and competing public policies.
Extending constitutional protections to non-media defendants,
while perhaps unintentionally penned in too broad of a fashion, is a
burden-shifting approach to qualified privileges. Once the defendant established
that the report was privileged, the plaintiff had the burden to prove abuse of that
privilege.
140. See RESTATEMENT, Special Note, supra note 56.
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sensible choice with regard to matters of public concern. To
extend the constitutional requirements to matters of private
concern, however, would seemingly eliminate all strict liability and
overrule the court's recent holding in Costello.
The adoption of a uniform negligence standard for all private
plaintiffs is a proper reflection of the trend in defamation law
toward states emphasizing uniformity. Further, with the ubiquity
of the Internet and other emerging privacy-related issues, the
court's decision properly protects the reputations of individuals by
adopting a lower standard.
Finally, the court's affirmation of a higher abuse standard to
defeat a qualified privilege is justified in limited circumstances.
Rather than writing defamation defendants a blank check, this
author would advise restricting it to matters of public concern or
exercising judicial restraint in finding the existence of the more
powerful qualified privilege.
Ultimately, the decision represents Louisiana's cautious and
calculated move toward a more uniform negligence standard that is
clearly beneficial to private plaintiffs when compared to the New
York Times actual malice standard. Before celebrating a victory,
however, defamation plaintiffs would be wise to tread carefully
around a stronger qualified privilege that represents the looming
shadow New York Times still casts over Louisiana defamation law.
Louis Edward Layrisson, III*
* The author would like to thank Professors John Church and Frank Maraist
for graciously providing guidance in the writing of this paper. All errors are my
own.
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V. APPENDIX
(1) A "public plaintiff' is a person who is either designated
as a public official or as a public figure. A public official is one
"whose governmental position has such apparent importance that
the public has a special interest in the qualifications and
performance of the person who holds it." 14 A public figure is one
who, whether through notoriety or through achievement,
successfully captures the public's attention for one or more
issues. 142 A person can be a public figure for one issue but not
others, and one may also be an involuntary public figure in some
circumtances. 
143
A. Public Plaintiffs
MATTE~R/
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT CONCERN STANDARD OF LIABILITY
Public Media Public The New York Times actual
malice standard would apply,
meaning that the plaintiff must
prove "knowing falsity or
reckless disregard" on the part of
the defendant.44
Public Non-Media Private Louisiana courts have applied the
actual malice standard here as
well. 145 It can be safely assumed
the same standard would apply in
matters of public concern.
141. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02. See also Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 715 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 737 So. 2d 706 (La. 1999) (discussing whether a
government employee could be considered a "public official"). The designation of
a plaintiff as a "public figure" is a question for the court. Guzzardo v. Adams, 411
So. 2d 1148 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
142. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02. See also Curtis Pub'g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
143. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 4, § 19.02. For example, a person
who does not seek public attention could still be considered a public figure if his
or her conduct was the subject of substantial media coverage or prominently
featured in tabloid reports.
144. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although it is possible
that a public plaintiff could sue a media defendant in a matter of purely private
concern, it would be a rare occurrence.
145. Wattingny v. Lambert, 453 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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(2) A "private plaintiff" is any other private citizen who is
not designated a public official or public figure.
The following tables summarize different scenarios classified
by plaintiff:
B. Private Plaintiffs'46
MATTER/
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT CONCERN STANDARD OF LIABILITY
Private Media Public Negligence
Private Media Private Although previous cases have
applied the actual malice
standard, 147 the Kennedy decision
adopts the negligence standard for
all private plaintiffs.
Private Non-Media Public Negligence
14
Private Non-Media Private Although there are minimal
constitutional concerns, 149 the
Kennedy decision leaves some
uncertainty as to whether any
possibility for strict liability
remains. When words are not
defamatory per se, it is likely that
the negligence standard will
apply.' 50 However, when words
are defamatory per se, it is
possible that either the negligence
standard or a strict liability
standard could apply.151
146. It is important to note that when a privilege is successfully invoked
against a private plaintiff, the standard of liability will be the "knowing
falsity/reckless disregard" standard regardless of the original burden on the
plaintiff-meaning that any negligence analysis would then be subsumed within
the higher actual malice standard.
147. See Hebert v. La. Assoc. of Rehabilitation Profs., 653 So. 2d 757 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1995).
148. This row represents the factual circumstances of the Kennedy decision.
149. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985).
150. See Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 675 (La.
2006); Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129 (La. 2004).
151. See Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 675; Costello, 864 So. 2d 129.
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